OpenAlex is a bibliographic catalogue of scientific papers, authors and institutions accessible in open access mode, named after the Library of Alexandria. It's citation coverage is excellent and I hope you will find utility in this listing of citing articles!
If you click the article title, you'll navigate to the article, as listed in CrossRef. If you click the Open Access links, you'll navigate to the "best Open Access location". Clicking the citation count will open this listing for that article. Lastly at the bottom of the page, you'll find basic pagination options.
Requested Article:
Moral Agency in Believing
Kate Nolfi
Philosophical Topics (2018) Vol. 46, Iss. 1, pp. 53-74
Closed Access | Times Cited: 16
Kate Nolfi
Philosophical Topics (2018) Vol. 46, Iss. 1, pp. 53-74
Closed Access | Times Cited: 16
Showing 16 citing articles:
Belief, Agency, and Knowledge
Matthew Chrisman
Oxford University Press eBooks (2022)
Closed Access | Times Cited: 10
Matthew Chrisman
Oxford University Press eBooks (2022)
Closed Access | Times Cited: 10
From Epistemic Expressivism to Epistemic Inferentialism
Matthew Chrisman
Oxford University Press eBooks (2022), pp. 172-190
Open Access | Times Cited: 5
Matthew Chrisman
Oxford University Press eBooks (2022), pp. 172-190
Open Access | Times Cited: 5
From Epistemic Contextualism to Epistemic Expressivism
Matthew Chrisman
Oxford University Press eBooks (2022), pp. 149-171
Closed Access | Times Cited: 4
Matthew Chrisman
Oxford University Press eBooks (2022), pp. 149-171
Closed Access | Times Cited: 4
The Activity of Maintaining Beliefs
Matthew Chrisman
Oxford University Press eBooks (2022), pp. 55-78
Closed Access
Matthew Chrisman
Oxford University Press eBooks (2022), pp. 55-78
Closed Access
Doxastic Involuntarism and ‘Ought to Believe’
Matthew Chrisman
Oxford University Press eBooks (2022), pp. 101-118
Closed Access
Matthew Chrisman
Oxford University Press eBooks (2022), pp. 101-118
Closed Access
Beliefs Are States Not Performances
Matthew Chrisman
Oxford University Press eBooks (2022), pp. 21-37
Closed Access
Matthew Chrisman
Oxford University Press eBooks (2022), pp. 21-37
Closed Access
The Aim of Belief and the Goal of Truth
Matthew Chrisman
Oxford University Press eBooks (2022), pp. 81-100
Closed Access
Matthew Chrisman
Oxford University Press eBooks (2022), pp. 81-100
Closed Access
Belief Formation Doesn’t Exhaust Doxastic Agency
Matthew Chrisman
Oxford University Press eBooks (2022), pp. 38-54
Closed Access
Matthew Chrisman
Oxford University Press eBooks (2022), pp. 38-54
Closed Access
Social Foundations for Epistemic Normativity
Matthew Chrisman
Oxford University Press eBooks (2022), pp. 119-146
Closed Access
Matthew Chrisman
Oxford University Press eBooks (2022), pp. 119-146
Closed Access
