OpenAlex is a bibliographic catalogue of scientific papers, authors and institutions accessible in open access mode, named after the Library of Alexandria. It's citation coverage is excellent and I hope you will find utility in this listing of citing articles!
If you click the article title, you'll navigate to the article, as listed in CrossRef. If you click the Open Access links, you'll navigate to the "best Open Access location". Clicking the citation count will open this listing for that article. Lastly at the bottom of the page, you'll find basic pagination options.
Requested Article:
Who's Afraid of Epistemic Dilemmas?
Nick Hughes
Routledge eBooks (2021), pp. 253-268
Closed Access | Times Cited: 18
Nick Hughes
Routledge eBooks (2021), pp. 253-268
Closed Access | Times Cited: 18
Showing 18 citing articles:
Moral Encroachment, Symmetry, and Believing Against the Evidence
Caroline von Klemperer
Philosophical Studies (2023) Vol. 180, Iss. 7, pp. 2175-2190
Closed Access | Times Cited: 13
Caroline von Klemperer
Philosophical Studies (2023) Vol. 180, Iss. 7, pp. 2175-2190
Closed Access | Times Cited: 13
The Puzzle of Epistemic Blame
Cameron Boult
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 10-34
Closed Access | Times Cited: 1
Cameron Boult
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 10-34
Closed Access | Times Cited: 1
A Relationship-Based Account of Epistemic Blame
Cameron Boult
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 64-81
Closed Access
Cameron Boult
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 64-81
Closed Access
The Value of Epistemic Blame
Cameron Boult
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 172-195
Closed Access
Cameron Boult
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 172-195
Closed Access
The Significance and Fittingness of Epistemic Blame
Cameron Boult
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 82-107
Closed Access
Cameron Boult
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 82-107
Closed Access
Blameworthy Belief, Assertion, and Other Epistemic Harms
Cameron Boult
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 108-139
Closed Access
Cameron Boult
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 108-139
Closed Access
Negative Emotions and Frustrated Desires
Cameron Boult
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 35-63
Closed Access
Cameron Boult
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 35-63
Closed Access
Is it ever rational to hold inconsistent beliefs?
Martin Smith
Philosophical Studies (2024) Vol. 181, Iss. 12, pp. 3459-3475
Open Access
Martin Smith
Philosophical Studies (2024) Vol. 181, Iss. 12, pp. 3459-3475
Open Access
The comparison problem for approximating epistemic ideals
Marc‐Kevin Daoust
Ratio (2022) Vol. 36, Iss. 1, pp. 22-31
Open Access | Times Cited: 1
Marc‐Kevin Daoust
Ratio (2022) Vol. 36, Iss. 1, pp. 22-31
Open Access | Times Cited: 1
