OpenAlex Citation Counts

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OpenAlex is a bibliographic catalogue of scientific papers, authors and institutions accessible in open access mode, named after the Library of Alexandria. It's citation coverage is excellent and I hope you will find utility in this listing of citing articles!

If you click the article title, you'll navigate to the article, as listed in CrossRef. If you click the Open Access links, you'll navigate to the "best Open Access location". Clicking the citation count will open this listing for that article. Lastly at the bottom of the page, you'll find basic pagination options.

Requested Article:

Knowing our Reasons: Distinctive Self‐Knowledge of Why We Hold Our Attitudes and Perform Actions
Sophie Keeling
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2019) Vol. 102, Iss. 2, pp. 318-341
Open Access | Times Cited: 20

Showing 20 citing articles:

Scepticism About Self-Knowledge of Motives
Pablo Hubacher Haerle
The Monist (2025) Vol. 108, Iss. 1, pp. 92-104
Open Access

Motivating reasons: The state of the question
Jean Moritz Müller
The Southern Journal of Philosophy (2025)
Open Access

Belief, Agency, and Knowledge
Matthew Chrisman
Oxford University Press eBooks (2022)
Closed Access | Times Cited: 10

From Epistemic Expressivism to Epistemic Inferentialism
Matthew Chrisman
Oxford University Press eBooks (2022), pp. 172-190
Open Access | Times Cited: 5

From Epistemic Contextualism to Epistemic Expressivism
Matthew Chrisman
Oxford University Press eBooks (2022), pp. 149-171
Closed Access | Times Cited: 4

Controlling our reasons
Sophie Keeling
Noûs (2022) Vol. 57, Iss. 4, pp. 832-849
Open Access | Times Cited: 4

Inferential self-knowledge reimagined
Benjamin Winokur
Philosophical Psychology (2023), pp. 1-21
Closed Access | Times Cited: 1

Discursive Integrity and the Principles of Responsible Public Debate
Matthew Chrisman
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2022) Vol. 22, Iss. 2
Open Access | Times Cited: 2

The Activity of Maintaining Beliefs
Matthew Chrisman
Oxford University Press eBooks (2022), pp. 55-78
Closed Access

Doxastic Involuntarism and ‘Ought to Believe’
Matthew Chrisman
Oxford University Press eBooks (2022), pp. 101-118
Closed Access

Introduction
Matthew Chrisman
Oxford University Press eBooks (2022), pp. 1-18
Closed Access

Beliefs Are States Not Performances
Matthew Chrisman
Oxford University Press eBooks (2022), pp. 21-37
Closed Access

The Aim of Belief and the Goal of Truth
Matthew Chrisman
Oxford University Press eBooks (2022), pp. 81-100
Closed Access

Belief Formation Doesn’t Exhaust Doxastic Agency
Matthew Chrisman
Oxford University Press eBooks (2022), pp. 38-54
Closed Access

Social Foundations for Epistemic Normativity
Matthew Chrisman
Oxford University Press eBooks (2022), pp. 119-146
Closed Access


Mark Schroeder, Saba Bazargan‐Forward, Stéphanie Collins, et al.
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2022) Vol. 22, Iss. 2
Open Access

Copyright Page
Matthew Chrisman
(2022), pp. iv-iv
Closed Access

Preface
Matthew Chrisman
Oxford University Press eBooks (2022), pp. vii-xii
Closed Access

Dedication
Matthew Chrisman
Oxford University Press eBooks (2022), pp. v-vi
Closed Access

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