OpenAlex is a bibliographic catalogue of scientific papers, authors and institutions accessible in open access mode, named after the Library of Alexandria. It's citation coverage is excellent and I hope you will find utility in this listing of citing articles!
If you click the article title, you'll navigate to the article, as listed in CrossRef. If you click the Open Access links, you'll navigate to the "best Open Access location". Clicking the citation count will open this listing for that article. Lastly at the bottom of the page, you'll find basic pagination options.
Requested Article:
Recognition and the perception–cognition divide
Greyson Abid
Mind & Language (2021) Vol. 37, Iss. 5, pp. 770-789
Open Access | Times Cited: 21
Greyson Abid
Mind & Language (2021) Vol. 37, Iss. 5, pp. 770-789
Open Access | Times Cited: 21
Showing 21 citing articles:
The Border Between Seeing and Thinking
Ned Block
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023)
Open Access | Times Cited: 149
Ned Block
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023)
Open Access | Times Cited: 149
Border Disputes: Recent Debates along the Perception–Cognition Border
Sam Clarke, Jacob Beck
Philosophy Compass (2023) Vol. 18, Iss. 8
Open Access | Times Cited: 3
Sam Clarke, Jacob Beck
Philosophy Compass (2023) Vol. 18, Iss. 8
Open Access | Times Cited: 3
Towards a two-factor approach to the cross-race effect
Greyson Abid
Philosophical Psychology (2024), pp. 1-22
Closed Access
Greyson Abid
Philosophical Psychology (2024), pp. 1-22
Closed Access
A Puzzle Concerning the Role of Affect in Recognition
Greyson Abid
Journal of Consciousness Studies (2024) Vol. 31, Iss. 9, pp. 158-174
Closed Access
Greyson Abid
Journal of Consciousness Studies (2024) Vol. 31, Iss. 9, pp. 158-174
Closed Access
Perception is iconic; cognition is discursive
Ned Block
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 215-264
Open Access | Times Cited: 1
Ned Block
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 215-264
Open Access | Times Cited: 1
Evidence that is wrongly taken to show that perception is conceptual
Ned Block
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 325-337
Open Access
Ned Block
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 325-337
Open Access
Cognitive penetration is common but does not challenge the joint
Ned Block
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 338-379
Open Access
Ned Block
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 338-379
Open Access
Core cognition and perceptual analogs of concepts
Ned Block
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 404-416
Open Access
Ned Block
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 404-416
Open Access
Neural evidence that perception is nonconceptual
Ned Block
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 306-324
Open Access
Ned Block
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 306-324
Open Access
Markers of the perceptual and the cognitive
Ned Block
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 61-120
Open Access
Ned Block
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 61-120
Open Access
Perception is constitutively nonpropositional and nonconceptual
Ned Block
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 166-214
Open Access
Ned Block
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 166-214
Open Access
Two kinds of seeing-as and singular content
Ned Block
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 121-165
Open Access
Ned Block
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 121-165
Open Access
Nonconceptual color perception
Ned Block
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 265-305
Open Access
Ned Block
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 265-305
Open Access
Top-down effects that are probably not cases of cognitive penetration
Ned Block
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 380-393
Open Access
Ned Block
Oxford University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 380-393
Open Access
