OpenAlex is a bibliographic catalogue of scientific papers, authors and institutions accessible in open access mode, named after the Library of Alexandria. It's citation coverage is excellent and I hope you will find utility in this listing of citing articles!
If you click the article title, you'll navigate to the article, as listed in CrossRef. If you click the Open Access links, you'll navigate to the "best Open Access location". Clicking the citation count will open this listing for that article. Lastly at the bottom of the page, you'll find basic pagination options.
Requested Article:
Knowledge and assertion in “Gettier” cases
John Turri
Philosophical Psychology (2016) Vol. 29, Iss. 5, pp. 759-775
Open Access | Times Cited: 68
John Turri
Philosophical Psychology (2016) Vol. 29, Iss. 5, pp. 759-775
Open Access | Times Cited: 68
Showing 1-25 of 68 citing articles:
Knowledge attributions in iterated fake barn cases
John Turri
Analysis (2017) Vol. 77, Iss. 1, pp. 104-115
Open Access | Times Cited: 63
John Turri
Analysis (2017) Vol. 77, Iss. 1, pp. 104-115
Open Access | Times Cited: 63
The norm of assertion: Empirical data
Markus Kneer
Cognition (2018) Vol. 177, pp. 165-171
Open Access | Times Cited: 51
Markus Kneer
Cognition (2018) Vol. 177, pp. 165-171
Open Access | Times Cited: 51
Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches
Christoph Kelp, John Greco
(2020)
Closed Access | Times Cited: 31
Christoph Kelp, John Greco
(2020)
Closed Access | Times Cited: 31
Closed-Mindedness As an Intellectual Vice
Heather Battaly
Cambridge University Press eBooks (2020), pp. 15-41
Closed Access | Times Cited: 21
Heather Battaly
Cambridge University Press eBooks (2020), pp. 15-41
Closed Access | Times Cited: 21
Experimental work on the norms of assertion
John Turri
Philosophy Compass (2017) Vol. 12, Iss. 7
Open Access | Times Cited: 22
John Turri
Philosophy Compass (2017) Vol. 12, Iss. 7
Open Access | Times Cited: 22
The point of assertion is to transmit knowledge
John Turri
Analysis (2016) Vol. 76, Iss. 2, pp. 130-136
Open Access | Times Cited: 20
John Turri
Analysis (2016) Vol. 76, Iss. 2, pp. 130-136
Open Access | Times Cited: 20
What Is Epistemic Entitlement?
Peter Graham
Cambridge University Press eBooks (2020), pp. 93-123
Closed Access | Times Cited: 19
Peter Graham
Cambridge University Press eBooks (2020), pp. 93-123
Closed Access | Times Cited: 19
Should I say that? An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion
Neri Marsili, Alex Wiegmann
Cognition (2021) Vol. 212, pp. 104657-104657
Open Access | Times Cited: 17
Neri Marsili, Alex Wiegmann
Cognition (2021) Vol. 212, pp. 104657-104657
Open Access | Times Cited: 17
The Gettier Problem and the Program of Analysis
Patrick Rysiew
Cambridge University Press eBooks (2018), pp. 159-176
Closed Access | Times Cited: 16
Patrick Rysiew
Cambridge University Press eBooks (2018), pp. 159-176
Closed Access | Times Cited: 16
Anti-risk Virtue Epistemology
Duncan Pritchard
Cambridge University Press eBooks (2020), pp. 203-224
Open Access | Times Cited: 13
Duncan Pritchard
Cambridge University Press eBooks (2020), pp. 203-224
Open Access | Times Cited: 13
Knowledge Is Extrinsically Apt Belief
Anne Meylan
Cambridge University Press eBooks (2020), pp. 166-180
Closed Access | Times Cited: 13
Anne Meylan
Cambridge University Press eBooks (2020), pp. 166-180
Closed Access | Times Cited: 13
Knowledge-Producing Abilities
John Greco
Cambridge University Press eBooks (2020), pp. 124-146
Closed Access | Times Cited: 12
John Greco
Cambridge University Press eBooks (2020), pp. 124-146
Closed Access | Times Cited: 12
Revisiting norms of assertion
John Turri
Cognition (2018) Vol. 177, pp. 8-11
Open Access | Times Cited: 11
John Turri
Cognition (2018) Vol. 177, pp. 8-11
Open Access | Times Cited: 11
The distinctive “should” of assertability
John Turri
Philosophical Psychology (2017) Vol. 30, Iss. 4, pp. 481-489
Open Access | Times Cited: 9
John Turri
Philosophical Psychology (2017) Vol. 30, Iss. 4, pp. 481-489
Open Access | Times Cited: 9
The Sensitivity Response to the Gettier Problem
Kelly Becker
Cambridge University Press eBooks (2018), pp. 108-124
Closed Access | Times Cited: 9
Kelly Becker
Cambridge University Press eBooks (2018), pp. 108-124
Closed Access | Times Cited: 9
Epistemic Luck, Knowledge-How, and Intentional Action
Carlotta Pavese, Paul Henne, Bob Beddor, et al.
Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy (2023) Vol. 10
Open Access | Times Cited: 3
Carlotta Pavese, Paul Henne, Bob Beddor, et al.
Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy (2023) Vol. 10
Open Access | Times Cited: 3
Experimental Epistemology and “Gettier” Cases
John Turri
Cambridge University Press eBooks (2018), pp. 199-217
Open Access | Times Cited: 8
John Turri
Cambridge University Press eBooks (2018), pp. 199-217
Open Access | Times Cited: 8
The Explanationist and the Modalist
Dario Mortini
Episteme (2022) Vol. 21, Iss. 2, pp. 371-386
Open Access | Times Cited: 4
Dario Mortini
Episteme (2022) Vol. 21, Iss. 2, pp. 371-386
Open Access | Times Cited: 4
The Gettier Problem and Epistemic Luck
Duncan Pritchard
Cambridge University Press eBooks (2018), pp. 96-107
Closed Access | Times Cited: 4
Duncan Pritchard
Cambridge University Press eBooks (2018), pp. 96-107
Closed Access | Times Cited: 4
Truth, fallibility, and justification: new studies in the norms of assertion
John Turri
Synthese (2020) Vol. 198, Iss. 9, pp. 8073-8084
Open Access | Times Cited: 4
John Turri
Synthese (2020) Vol. 198, Iss. 9, pp. 8073-8084
Open Access | Times Cited: 4
The Gettier Problem and Fallibilism
Charity Anderson
Cambridge University Press eBooks (2018), pp. 11-26
Closed Access | Times Cited: 3
Charity Anderson
Cambridge University Press eBooks (2018), pp. 11-26
Closed Access | Times Cited: 3
Knowledge from Non-Knowledge: Inference, Testimony and Memory
Federico Luzzi
(2019)
Closed Access | Times Cited: 3
Federico Luzzi
(2019)
Closed Access | Times Cited: 3
