OpenAlex Citation Counts

OpenAlex Citations Logo

OpenAlex is a bibliographic catalogue of scientific papers, authors and institutions accessible in open access mode, named after the Library of Alexandria. It's citation coverage is excellent and I hope you will find utility in this listing of citing articles!

If you click the article title, you'll navigate to the article, as listed in CrossRef. If you click the Open Access links, you'll navigate to the "best Open Access location". Clicking the citation count will open this listing for that article. Lastly at the bottom of the page, you'll find basic pagination options.

Requested Article:

Representing the Mind as Such in Infancy
Peter Carruthers
Review of Philosophy and Psychology (2020) Vol. 11, Iss. 4, pp. 765-781
Closed Access | Times Cited: 51

Showing 1-25 of 51 citing articles:

The Building Blocks of Thought
Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024)
Closed Access | Times Cited: 2

Primitivist theories of truth: Their history and prospects
Jeremy Wyatt
Philosophy Compass (2022) Vol. 17, Iss. 6
Open Access | Times Cited: 5

Growth From Uncertainty: Understanding the Replication ‘Crisis’ in Infant Cognition
Jane Suilin Lavelle
Philosophy of Science (2023) Vol. 91, Iss. 2, pp. 390-409
Open Access | Times Cited: 2

The Evolution of Fodor’s Case against Concept Learning
Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 533-545
Closed Access

Embodied Cognition
Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 511-526
Closed Access

Fodor’s Biological Account of Concept Acquisition—and the Importance of Cultural Learning
Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 580-596
Closed Access

Conclusion to Part III
Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 527-530
Closed Access

Coda
Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 600-604
Closed Access

Not All Concepts Are Innate
Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 546-579
Closed Access

The Argument from Early Development (2)
Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 258-288
Closed Access

Conclusion to Part I
Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 229-232
Closed Access

Artificial Neural Networks
Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 461-479
Closed Access

The Viability of Rationalism
Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 104-145
Closed Access

The Argument from Universality
Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 311-330
Closed Access

Preface and Guide to the Book
Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis
(2024), pp. ix-xii
Closed Access

The Argument from Neural Wiring
Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 356-371
Closed Access

The Argument from Animals
Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 289-310
Closed Access

Methodological Empiricism
Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 421-443
Closed Access

The Argument from Cognitive and Behavioural Quirks
Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 393-415
Closed Access

Why the Rationalism-Empiricism Debate Isn’t the Nature-Nurture Debate
Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 81-103
Closed Access

The Argument from Early Development (1)
Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 235-257
Closed Access

Abstraction and the Allure of Illusory Explanation
Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 146-183
Closed Access

Neo-Associationism
Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 444-460
Closed Access

Introduction
Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 1-22
Closed Access

Page 1 - Next Page

Scroll to top