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OpenAlex Citation Counts

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OpenAlex is a bibliographic catalogue of scientific papers, authors and institutions accessible in open access mode, named after the Library of Alexandria. It's citation coverage is excellent and I hope you will find utility in this listing of citing articles!

If you click the article title, you'll navigate to the article, as listed in CrossRef. If you click the Open Access links, you'll navigate to the "best Open Access location". Clicking the citation count will open this listing for that article. Lastly at the bottom of the page, you'll find basic pagination options.

Requested Article:

Belief’s minimal rationality
Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini
Philosophical Studies (2019) Vol. 177, Iss. 11, pp. 3263-3282
Closed Access | Times Cited: 23

Showing 23 citing articles:

The signaling function of sharing fake stories
Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini
Mind & Language (2021) Vol. 38, Iss. 1, pp. 64-80
Closed Access | Times Cited: 27
On the Irreducibility of Attitudinal Imagining
Alon Chasid
Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy (2025) Vol. 12
Open Access
Belief as emotion
Miriam Schleifer McCormick
Philosophical Issues (2022) Vol. 32, Iss. 1, pp. 104-119
Open Access | Times Cited: 6
On a Columnar Self: Two Senses of Expressing Partisanship
Manuel Almagro
Res Publica (2023) Vol. 30, Iss. 3, pp. 509-527
Closed Access | Times Cited: 2
Superstitious–magical imaginings
Anna Ichino
Analysis (2024)
Closed Access
Conclusion
Miriam Schleifer McCormick
(2024), pp. 137-140
Closed Access
Trusting Is Believing
Miriam Schleifer McCormick
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 79-98
Closed Access
Implicit Attitudes and Self-Deception
Miriam Schleifer McCormick
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 99-116
Closed Access
Defending Doxasticism about Delusions
Miriam Schleifer McCormick
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 41-59
Closed Access
Belief as a Blended State
Miriam Schleifer McCormick
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 15-40
Closed Access
Deep Disagreement and Belief Alteration
Miriam Schleifer McCormick
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 117-136
Closed Access
Defending Doxasticism about Religious Conviction and Political Ideology
Miriam Schleifer McCormick
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 60-78
Closed Access
Copyright Page
Miriam Schleifer McCormick
(2024), pp. iv-iv
Closed Access
Introduction
Miriam Schleifer McCormick
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 1-14
Closed Access
Belief as Emotion
Miriam Schleifer McCormick
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024)
Closed Access
Dedication
Miriam Schleifer McCormick
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. v-vi
Closed Access
Preface
Miriam Schleifer McCormick
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. ix-xii
Closed Access
Black magic and respecting persons—Some perplexities
Saul Smilansky, Juha Räikkä
Ratio (2020) Vol. 33, Iss. 3, pp. 173-183
Closed Access | Times Cited: 3
No Epistemic Norm or Aim Needed
Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini
Episteme (2020) Vol. 19, Iss. 3, pp. 337-352
Closed Access | Times Cited: 2
How can belief be akratic?
Eugene Chislenko
Synthese (2021) Vol. 199, Iss. 5-6, pp. 13925-13948
Closed Access | Times Cited: 2
Engaging with “Fringe” Beliefs: Why, When, and How
Miriam Schleifer McCormick
Episteme (2023), pp. 1-16
Open Access
Cognitivism and the argument from evidence non-responsiveness*
John Eriksson, Marco Tiozzo
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (2023)
Open Access
Can People Believe Whatever They Want? Children and Adults’ Intuitions of the Controllability of Beliefs
Joshua A. Confer, Hanna Schleihauf, Jan M. Engelmann
SSRN Electronic Journal (2022)
Closed Access
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