OpenAlex Citation Counts

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OpenAlex is a bibliographic catalogue of scientific papers, authors and institutions accessible in open access mode, named after the Library of Alexandria. It's citation coverage is excellent and I hope you will find utility in this listing of citing articles!

If you click the article title, you'll navigate to the article, as listed in CrossRef. If you click the Open Access links, you'll navigate to the "best Open Access location". Clicking the citation count will open this listing for that article. Lastly at the bottom of the page, you'll find basic pagination options.

Requested Article:

Dissolving the epistemic/ethical dilemma over implicit bias
Katherine Puddifoot
Philosophical Explorations (2017) Vol. 20, Iss. sup1, pp. 73-93
Open Access | Times Cited: 65

Showing 26-50 of 65 citing articles:

Implicit Attitudes and Self-Deception
Miriam Schleifer McCormick
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 99-116
Closed Access

Defending Doxasticism about Delusions
Miriam Schleifer McCormick
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 41-59
Closed Access

Belief as a Blended State
Miriam Schleifer McCormick
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 15-40
Closed Access

Deep Disagreement and Belief Alteration
Miriam Schleifer McCormick
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 117-136
Closed Access

Defending Doxasticism about Religious Conviction and Political Ideology
Miriam Schleifer McCormick
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 60-78
Closed Access

Copyright Page
Miriam Schleifer McCormick
(2024), pp. iv-iv
Closed Access

Introduction
Miriam Schleifer McCormick
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 1-14
Closed Access

Belief as Emotion
Miriam Schleifer McCormick
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024)
Closed Access

Dedication
Miriam Schleifer McCormick
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. v-vi
Closed Access

Preface
Miriam Schleifer McCormick
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. ix-xii
Closed Access

Disclosure of Mental Health: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives
Katherine Puddifoot
Philosophy, psychiatry & psychology (2019) Vol. 26, Iss. 4, pp. 333-348
Open Access | Times Cited: 3

Responsibility for implicitly biased behavior: A habit‐based approach
Josefa Toribio
Journal of Social Philosophy (2021) Vol. 53, Iss. 2, pp. 239-254
Open Access | Times Cited: 2

How Not to Deal with the Tragic Dilemma
Joshua Mugg
Social Epistemology (2020) Vol. 34, Iss. 3, pp. 253-264
Closed Access | Times Cited: 1

Race and Moral Psychology
Robin Zheng
Oxford University Press eBooks (2022), pp. 1000-1020
Closed Access | Times Cited: 1

Implicit Bias
Jules Holroyd
The International Encyclopedia of Ethics (2019), pp. 1-14
Closed Access | Times Cited: 1

Bias Dilemma
Oisín Deery, Katherine Bailey
Feminist Philosophy Quarterly (2022) Vol. 8, Iss. 3/4
Open Access | Times Cited: 1

Prejudice from an Epistemological Point of View
Endre Begby
Oxford University Press eBooks (2021), pp. 7-25
Closed Access | Times Cited: 1

Automated Risk Assessment in the Criminal Justice Process
Endre Begby
Oxford University Press eBooks (2021), pp. 135-154
Closed Access | Times Cited: 1

Defining Stereotypes and Stereotyping
Katherine Puddifoot
Oxford University Press eBooks (2021), pp. 13-30
Closed Access | Times Cited: 1

Against Comfort: Political Implications of Evading Discomfort
Ditte Marie Munch‐Jurišić
Bristol University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 111-134
Open Access

Against Comfort: Political Implications of Evading Discomfort
Ditte Marie Munch‐Jurišić
Bristol University Press eBooks (2023), pp. 111-134
Open Access

Références bibliographiques du fascicule

Revue philosophique de la France et de l étranger (2018) Vol. Tome 143, Iss. 3, pp. 407-416
Closed Access

Common Ground
Endre Begby
Oxford University Press eBooks (2021), pp. 114-134
Closed Access

A Better Approach
Endre Begby
Oxford University Press eBooks (2021), pp. 174-192
Closed Access

From Psychology to Philosophy
Endre Begby
Oxford University Press eBooks (2021), pp. 43-60
Closed Access

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