OpenAlex Citation Counts

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OpenAlex is a bibliographic catalogue of scientific papers, authors and institutions accessible in open access mode, named after the Library of Alexandria. It's citation coverage is excellent and I hope you will find utility in this listing of citing articles!

If you click the article title, you'll navigate to the article, as listed in CrossRef. If you click the Open Access links, you'll navigate to the "best Open Access location". Clicking the citation count will open this listing for that article. Lastly at the bottom of the page, you'll find basic pagination options.

Requested Article:

Dissolving the epistemic/ethical dilemma over implicit bias
Katherine Puddifoot
Philosophical Explorations (2017) Vol. 20, Iss. sup1, pp. 73-93
Open Access | Times Cited: 65

Showing 1-25 of 65 citing articles:

Beyond accuracy: Epistemic flaws with statistical generalizations
Jessie Munton
Philosophical Issues (2019) Vol. 29, Iss. 1, pp. 228-240
Open Access | Times Cited: 82

Irrationality
Ema Sullivan‐Bissett
(2025)
Closed Access | Times Cited: 1

What is implicit bias?
Jules Holroyd, Robin Scaife, Tom Stafford
Philosophy Compass (2017) Vol. 12, Iss. 10
Open Access | Times Cited: 49

How Stereotypes Deceive Us
Katherine Puddifoot
Oxford University Press eBooks (2021)
Closed Access | Times Cited: 35

The Psychology of Stereotypes
Endre Begby
Oxford University Press eBooks (2021), pp. 26-42
Closed Access | Times Cited: 33

The epistemic innocence of clinical memory distortions
Lisa Bortolotti, Ema Sullivan‐Bissett
Mind & Language (2018) Vol. 33, Iss. 3, pp. 263-279
Open Access | Times Cited: 42

Stereotyping Patients
Katherine Puddifoot
Journal of Social Philosophy (2019) Vol. 50, Iss. 1, pp. 69-90
Open Access | Times Cited: 40

Prejudice
Endre Begby
Oxford University Press eBooks (2021)
Closed Access | Times Cited: 30

Implicit Bias and Social Knowledge
Katherine Puddifoot
Oxford University Press eBooks (2025), pp. 357-378
Closed Access

(How) Should We Tell Implicit Bias Stories?
Jennifer Saul
Disputatio (2018) Vol. 10, Iss. 50, pp. 217-244
Open Access | Times Cited: 35

Epistemic innocence and the production of false memory beliefs
Katherine Puddifoot, Lisa Bortolotti
Philosophical Studies (2018) Vol. 176, Iss. 3, pp. 755-780
Open Access | Times Cited: 33

Implicit bias, ideological bias, and epistemic risks in philosophy
Uwe Peters
Mind & Language (2018) Vol. 34, Iss. 3, pp. 393-419
Open Access | Times Cited: 27

Order-Based Salience Patterns in Language: What They Are and Why They Matter
Ella Kate Whiteley
Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy (2024) Vol. 11
Open Access | Times Cited: 2

Moral Agency in Believing
Kate Nolfi
Philosophical Topics (2018) Vol. 46, Iss. 1, pp. 53-74
Closed Access | Times Cited: 16

Against comfort: political implications of evading discomfort
Ditte Marie Munch‐Jurišić
Global Discourse (2020) Vol. 10, Iss. 2, pp. 277-297
Open Access | Times Cited: 12

Indoctrination, delusion and the possibility of epistemic innocence
Ruth Wareham
Theory and Research in Education (2019) Vol. 17, Iss. 1, pp. 40-61
Open Access | Times Cited: 11

Defining Wokeness
J. Spencer Atkins
Social Epistemology (2023) Vol. 37, Iss. 3, pp. 321-338
Closed Access | Times Cited: 3

Monothematic delusion: A case of innocence from experience
Ema Sullivan‐Bissett
Philosophical Psychology (2018) Vol. 31, Iss. 6, pp. 920-947
Open Access | Times Cited: 8

An argument for egalitarian confirmation bias and against political diversity in academia
Uwe Peters
Synthese (2020) Vol. 198, Iss. 12, pp. 11999-12019
Open Access | Times Cited: 7

Evidential Preemption
Endre Begby
Oxford University Press eBooks (2021), pp. 95-113
Closed Access | Times Cited: 5

Knowing your past: Trauma, stress, and mnemonic epistemic injustice
Katherine Puddifoot, Clara Sandelind
Journal of Social Philosophy (2024)
Open Access

Toward an Ethics of AI Belief
Winnie Ma, Vincent Valton
Philosophy & Technology (2024) Vol. 37, Iss. 3
Open Access

Conclusion
Miriam Schleifer McCormick
(2024), pp. 137-140
Closed Access

Trusting Is Believing
Miriam Schleifer McCormick
Oxford University Press eBooks (2024), pp. 79-98
Closed Access

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